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ARTICLES
Religion and Philosophy: 
Miki Kiyoshi’s Philosophy of Religion
I./0/ F87*/,*
M*,* K*:4-6* 三木清 (1897–1945) was one of modern Japan’s major philoso-phers. As a student, he would attend the sermons of Chikazumi J#kan 近角
常観 (1870–1941), a J#do Shinsh$ 浄土真宗 priest who played an important role in 
modern Japanese intellectual and religious history. Miki never forgot this experience 
of listening to Chikazumi preach. We can gain an overview of the basic characteristics 
of Miki’s thought, which have not been adequately understood, by keeping in mind 
his relationship with Chikazumi. Miki worked to construct his own philosophy of 
religion, developing his ideas while being both directly and indirectly in>uenced by 
Chikazumi. !e aim of this essay is to make clear the characteristics of Miki’s philoso-
phy of religion. By doing so, I hope to sketch for readers a picture of one of the many 
young intellectuals who listened to Chikazumi’s Shin 真 Buddhist teachings, as well as 
present a new side of modern Japanese intellectual history that emerges when we situ-
ate Chikazumi in our =eld of vision.
Chikazumi J#kan’s Life and Its Historical Signi)cance
In the decades surrounding the turn of the twentieth century, Buddhists such as 
Chikazumi were engaging in innovative proselytization, similar to that of Christians 
such as Uchimura Kanz# 内村鑑三 (1861–1930) and Ebina Danj# 海老名弾正 (1856–
1937), who at the time in>uenced young Japanese through their Bible research groups 
and church sermons. 
Chikazumi was born in what is today Nagahama 長浜 City’s Kohokuch# 湖北町 
(Shiga Prefecture). He was the oldest son of Chikazumi J#zui 近角常随 (ca. 1838–
1904), the twelfth-generation head priest of Saigenji 西源寺, a temple belonging to the 
T6*- /'0*+9( =rst appeared as “Sh$ky# to tetsugaku: Miki Kiyoshi no sh$ky# tetsugaku” 宗教と哲学：
三木清の宗教哲学 in Iwata 2014b, ch. 12, pp. 223–70. 
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"tani 大谷 school of Shin Buddhism. Expected from birth to become a Shin priest, 
Chikazumi received a thorough education in sect teachings and scripture-reading 
methods starting at a very young age. After studying at Ky#to-fu Jinj# Ch$gakk# 
京都府尋常中学校 (Kyoto Prefectural Ordinary Middle School), at the recommendation 
of Kiyozawa Manshi 清沢満之 (1863–1903), he was sent by Higashi Honganji 東本 
願寺 to study in Tokyo. At the Daiichi K#t# Gakk# 第一高等学校 (First Higher School) 
and Tokyo Imperial University, he trained in Western academic =elds. In September 
1897, while an undergraduate, he had a decisive conversion following a period of deep 
anguish. He would gradually come to discuss this experience at Bukky# Seinen Kai 仏教 
青年会 (Buddhist Youth Association) lectures, in articles in the periodical Seiky# jih# 
政教時報, and elsewhere. After graduating, at the order of Higashi Honganji he spent 
two years in the United States and Europe observing the religious situation there. 
While Chikazumi was abroad from 1900 to 1902, Kiyozawa Manshi moved into his 
vacant residence in Hong# Morikawa 本郷森川 in Tokyo and started the K#k#d# 
浩々洞 group. After coming back to Japan, Chikazumi established the student board-
ing facility Ky$d# Gakusha 求道学舎 at his former place of residence and passionately 
engaged in Shin proselytization activities. Chikazumi’s sermons were based on his own 
experiences, which he referred to as jikken 実験, a term that also means “experiment.” 
!is emphasis on jikken was found in Chikazumi’s thought and in that of many other 
religious =gures of his time. 
Partially due to the proximity of Tokyo Imperial University, a great number of 
young people gathered to hear Chikazumi’s sermons in Hong# Morikawa. !ey were 
not only men; Chikazumi had many female followers, including students from Japan 
Women’s University. Eventually, his audiences could no longer =t inside the Ky$d# 
Gakusha, and therefore in 1915 he established nearby the Ky$d# Kaikan 求道会館, a 
Western-style brick building for preaching. In 1931, Chikazumi had a cerebral hemor-
rhage. While his opportunities to preach and engage in other activities were reduced 
due to frequent hospitalizations, he continued to proselytize at the Ky$d# Kaikan until 
he died in 1941.
Let us turn to the people that listened to Chikazumi’s sermons. In addition to Miki, 
Tanikawa Tetsuz# 谷川徹三 (1895–1989), Shirai Shigenobu 白井成允 (1888–1973), 
and Takeuchi Yoshinori 武内義範 (1913–2002) each had close connections with Chika-
zumi that they would never forget, and all would subsequently become famous as phi-
losophers and/or scholars of philosophy. Iwanami Shigeo 岩波茂雄 (1881–1946), the 
founder of the famous publisher Iwanami Shoten, went to Chikazumi for help in resolv-
ing his psychospiritual troubles, and the novelist Kamura Isota 嘉村礒多 (1897–1933), 
a writer of “I-novels” (shish#setsu 私小説), took Chikazumi as his teacher and depicted 
him in his works G#ku 業苦 (Karmic Su;ering) and Gake no shita 崖の下 (Beneath the 
Cli;s). Also, the family of the famous writer Miyazawa Kenji 宮沢賢治 (1896–1933) 
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used to go to hear Chikazumi preach. While it is not clear whether or not Kenji him-
self did so, and the precise nature of his relationship with Chikazumi is also not cer-
tain, Kenji’s father, Masajir# 政次郎 (1874–1957), did have close ties with Chikazumi. 
For example, he invited Chikazumi to the city of Hanamaki 花巻 (Iwate Prefecture). In 
the =eld of psychoanalysis, Kosawa Heisaku 古澤平作 (1897–1968), the =rst president 
of the Japan Psychoanalytical Association (Nihon Seishin Bunseki Gakkai 日本精神分
析学会), was a fervent Chikazumi follower, and Chikazumi’s sermons became a foun-
tainhead for this =eld in Japan. Chikazumi’s in>uence also extended to the thought 
of Kosawa’s pupils Okonogi Keigo 小此木啓吾 (1930–2003) and Doi Takeo 土居健郎 
(1920–2009).1
Following the Meiji 明治 Restoration in 1868, many Buddhists sought to modern-
ize Buddhism in line with Japan’s westernization e;orts. Chikazumi was one of them. 
However, another predominant feature of Chikazumi’s activities was the reconstitu-
tion of tradition: he took traditional Shin Buddhist doctrines and organizational 
forms that had existed even before the early modern period and adjusted them for 
modern Japan.
We can understand how he did so through the example of the Tannish# 歎異抄, 
a work synonymous with his proselytization. Even today, people sometimes say 
that the Tannish# became well-known thanks to Kiyozawa Manshi’s discovery of 
it after four hundred years of obscurity following the work’s banning by Rennyo 
蓮如 (1415–1499). However, scholarship has made clear that this narrative includes 
misunderstandings; during the Edo 江戸 period (1603–1868), the Tannish# was pub-
lished in many forms and was the subject of many academic studies, lectures, and 
sermons. !is was true for both Higashi and Nishi Honganji 西本願寺. For Chika-
zumi, the Tannish# was a traditional Shin Buddhist religious work handed down to 
him by his father. However, Chikazumi read the Tannish# in quite a di;erent way. In 
Kohoku, J#zui had read it together with a small group of familiar faces. In contrast, 
Chikazumi lectured on the Tannish# in Hong# in front of large crowds, comprised of 
many people he did not personally know, and furthermore, he then published these 
lectures. Chikazumi’s sermons and publications contributed signi=cantly to the spread 
of this text from the Meiji period (1868–1912) onwards.
!e architectural style of the Ky$d# Kaikan, Chikazumi’s base for propagation, 
symbolizes his reconstitution of tradition. It was designed by Takeda Goichi 武田五一 
(1872–1938), and on the outside it resembles a two-story Christian church. !e =rst 
>oor also imitates a church: it is wood-paneled and contains three-person wooden 
benches. During Chikazumi’s time, the second->oor gallery was covered with tatami 
mats, on which audience members would sit. Inside, at the front of the building, is a 
1 Regarding the relationship between Chikazumi and Japanese psychoanalysis, see Iwata 2014a.
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platform that contains a Buddhist altar. !e altar includes a small hexagonal reliquary, 
made out of unadorned hinoki cypress in a Japanese style, that enshrines a standing 
statue of Amida Nyorai 阿弥陀如来. It was inside this building, a combination of Japa-
nese and Western styles, that Chikazumi preached.
Young people who came to Tokyo from the provinces freely listened to Chikazumi’s 
experience-based sermons with their school friends. Many people attended these ser-
mons, which, like at a Christian church, were held on Sunday mornings. However, 
Chikazumi did not just preach at his audience. He often would organize events for dis-
cussing religious beliefs and answering questions from his followers. !is was another 
way that he reconstituted the Shin tradition. From ages past, Shin Buddhist followers 
formed organizations called k# 講. In them, members were encouraged to talk with 
each other about their own religious beliefs. !is practice was referred to as shinjin no 
sata 信心の沙汰. !e events that Chikazumi organized reworked this tradition to con-
struct a space in which followers from society at large could freely come together and 
discuss religion. !ey also satis=ed the psychospiritual desires of young people who, 
having left their hometowns, tended to become isolated in Tokyo.
At the beginning of the Meiji period, approximately 30 percent of Japanese people 
were Shin Buddhists. However, as European and American culture permeated Japan 
following the Meiji Restoration, the number of people who could no longer accept 
Shin teachings had increased. !is was particularly true of the young people that had 
left behind their local communities and temples to study at high schools and universi-
ties in the capital. !ey were compelled to reconsider their stance toward spiritual mat-
ters. Each taking stock of their own self-formation, they sought to encounter religion 
in a new way. A typical example of this was Miki Kiyoshi.
Shinjin no sata evoled into a new form in the pages of Chikazumi’s periodical Ky"d# 
求道. Ky"d# was published, generally monthly, from 1904 to 1922. Many religious 
confessions shared by anonymous followers were printed therein: in its letters column, 
they would discuss their own religious beliefs drawn from their day-to-day lives. !is 
column helped form a loose network among not only Chikazumi and his followers, 
but also between the followers themselves. Such a column was a =rst for a Buddhist 
periodical. !ere was a similar one, though, in Uchimura Kanz#’s Seisho no kenky" 
聖書之研究, yet another example of a characteristic that Chikazumi and the Christian 
Uchimura had in common.
While the abovementioned activities of Chikazumi had a great in>uence during his 
time, he has not received due attention. A major reason for this is that he took in tra-
ditional Shin teachings, as well as the religious ethos that supported Shin institutions, 
and then reconstituted them. Today, many Japanese people may feel that his teach-
ings are not novel but, rather, conservative and obsolete. However, the psychospiritual 
world of Japanese modernity, as well as the reconstitution of its traditions, emerged 
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together with the country’s encounter with the West, and we cannot adequately under-
stand the characteristics of modern thought in Japan if we ignore this fact. Chikazumi 
was one prominent =gure who reconstituted a tradition that, for many people, had 
become either vague or seemingly self-evident.
Young, modern intellectuals were unable to accept religions in their early modern 
forms. If we adopt a perspective that understands Japan’s “traditions” as unchanging 
in substance and possessing a self-evident nature, we will not notice the importance of 
Chikazumi. His signi=cance comes into relief when we re>ect upon how Japan’s tradi-
tions were reconstituted. Chikazumi’s activities refashioned Shin Buddhism in a mod-
ern manner and allowed it to be comfortably assimilated by many young intellectuals. 
Unless we pay close attention, we will overlook this legacy of Chikazumi’s activities. 
Reexamining this, and other such assimilations that took place, can help us deepen our 
understanding of the psychospiritual situation both in Japan’s modern period and in 
Japan today, which, after all, has inherited the legacy of modernity.2
Miki’s Philosophy as “Philosophy of Religion”
Chikazumi had a close relationship with philosophy, which can be seen in a number of 
respects. In the =rst place, it was philosophy that Chikazumi himself primarily studied 
as an undergraduate at Tokyo Imperial University. He then went on to graduate school, 
wrote articles on the subject, and also taught philosophy of religion as a lecturer at 
the Tetsugakukan 哲学館 (Philosophy Academy). While he would subsequently leave 
behind research in philosophy to engage in proselytization, we =nd scattered through-
out these activities teachings that were based on his previous studies of philosophy. For 
this reason, there are a considerable number of topics to be discussed regarding Chika-
zumi’s relationship with philosophy. Here, I will focus upon one of these—his impact 
upon Miki Kiyoshi’s philosophy of religion.
Some might be surprised that I am approaching Miki’s philosophy as “philosophy 
of religion.” It is certainly true that there is little research that examines Miki’s thought 
from such a perspective. !ose researching his thought have been primarily interested 
in its social philosophy and social theories. !e strong impression left by his philo-
sophical inquiries into Marxism, as well as his unfortunate death after his arrest under 
the Peace Preservation Laws (Chian Ijih# 治安維持法), also surely have played a role. 
At any rate, the majority of scholars with an interest in Miki’s social philosophy have 
taken a lukewarm attitude towards religion. As a result, they have also been perplexed 
as to how to handle the ideas about religion that he left behind.
2 I invite readers to view the following website, which contains materials related to Chikazumi, 
such as Ky"d# and other of his publications: Chikazumi J#kan Kenky$ Shiry# Saito 近角常観研究資料
サイト. http://chikazumi.cc.osaka-kyoiku.ac.jp.
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After his tragic death, Miki’s un=nished manuscript on Shinran, covering two hun-
dred eighty-four pages each =lled with two hundred characters, was discovered (below, 
“Shinran”). It appears that Miki was working on it right up until his arrest in March 
1945. However, Miki scholars have found it di<cult to understand why this manuscript 
exists. While this is partially due to it having been left un=nished, they also have held 
that there are discrepancies between it and his preceding philosophical ideas. Ever since 
its discovery, the popular opinion is that it deviates from his philosophical views. How-
ever, in recent years, some scholars have recognized that “religion” is at the foundation 
of Miki’s philosophy.3 However, even their research has not yet actively tried to evalu-
ate the position of religion within Miki’s overall phlosophy. !erefore, in this article I 
will make clear that Miki’s philosophical work aimed to construct a unique philosophy 
of religion.
Miki’s Life and “Religion”
Religion lies at the basis of Miki Kiyoshi’s thought. While he may not have =nished 
it, he attempted to construct his own philosophy of religion. First, I want to provide a 
3 Karaki Junz# was the =rst person to carry out research on Miki’s “Shinran.” Karaki, who knew 
Miki when he was alive, wrote Miki Kiyoshi soon after his death, discussing Miki’s thought in favor-
able terms. However, even Karaki had to raise a “doubt” that K#s#ryoku no ronri 構想力の論理 
(!e Logic of Imagination), Miki’s major late-period work, has aspects that are incompatible with 
“Shinran.” He held that there is a mismatch between the former, which is about the “philosophy of 
in=nite self-transcendence,” and the latter, which takes “complete reliance on a transcendent being” 
as its premise (Karaki 1966, pp. 184–85). Karaki’s doubts regarding Miki’s work would be repeatedly 
raised in subsequent research on Miki. !erein, we also =nd two tendencies: one to treat the problem 
carefully and another to avoid it. !ere was also research that attaches importance to the historical-
social existential philosophy of human beings found in K#s#ryoku no ronri and does not take up the 
issue of Miki and religion head on. It was in this context that the work of Tsuda Masao, Tairako 
Tomonaga, and others appeared which holds that “religion” is at the foundation of Miki’s philosophy 
and thinking. Tsuda wrote Bunka to sh"ky# 文化と宗教 (1998), as well as Jin’i to shizen: Miki Kiyoshi 
no shis#shiteki kenky" 人為と自然：三木清の思想史的研究 (2007). In these works, he discusses the 
transformation of Miki’s philosophy, pointing out the importance of religion for Miki and recognizing 
the signi=cance of this fact. However, Tsuda did so from a perspective critical of religion. Tairako also 
points out that the issue of religion was important for Miki, shifting the discussion from a perspective 
that critically examined Miki’s position vis-a-vis religion to one that reconsidered it rather positively. 
First, in his 2002 article “Miki Kiyoshi no shis# no akuchuariti” 三木清の思想のアクチユアリティ, 
while bringing to light the important position of religion in Miki’s philosophy, he critically argued 
that this led to its major shortcoming. However, he would then attempt to reconsider the location of 
religion in Miki’s philosophy (Tairako 2010). With that said, while Tairako recognizes the importance 
of religion for Miki, using cautious phrasing he takes the position that Miki’s philosophy is not phi-
losophy of religion.
Nishizuka Shunta (2008) has tried to understand Miki’s philosophy as a whole (up through “Shin-
ran”). Also, Uchida Hiroshi has published a work in which he presents Miki as “a philosopher who 
explored a ‘historical philosophy of the imagination of the individual’ that is extremely similar to a 
philosophy of religion” (Uchida 2004, p. 9).
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general overview of the position that religion occupied in Miki’s life. In the section that 
follows I will consider a text in which Miki =rst discusses Taish#-period (1912–1926) 
ky#y#shugi 教養主義 (self-cultivation through education) and explain the intellectual 
situation that stimulated the formation of his thought. !en, I will turn to Miki’s 
notes (“Shuki” 手記) to make clear the position of religion within his philosophical 
thought.
Miki was a young man during the time that ky#y#shugi was an important trend 
in Japanese philosophical culture, and he heard Chikazumi preach when he was a 
student at the First Higher School. In a list of the books he has read, Miki recalls 
the intellectual situation of this time, stating that it was an era in which “human-
ism” appeared in =ve forms,4 namely, (1) self-cultivation, (2) religion, (3) the Shi-
rakaba 白樺 literary coterie, (4) the Gakky$-ha 学究派, an academic school that 
supported the ideal of “culture,” and (5) the philosophy of life (sei no tetsugaku 
生の哲学). Here we should note that Miki was not in>uenced by only one of these: “I 
have been in>uenced by all of these to some extent.”5 !is was the context in which 
the ideas that Miki would subsequently develop began to form. When touching on (3) 
the Shirakaba literary coterie, he draws our attention to the fact that its interest “had 
shifted to societal problems.”6 Judging from Miki’s own recollections, it appears that 
=rst as a young man he took an interest in societal problems in the wider context of 
humanism, and then came to tackle them head-on, enthusiastically discussing Marx-
ism and engaging with problems related to the societal dimension. Miki holds that his 
primary position was that of the Gakky$-ha. !is term referred to philosophers with 
an interest in Neo-Kantian value theory. Regarding “philosophy of life,” Miki states 
that while at the time he did not have much of an interest in Henri Bergson (1859–
1941), a philosophy of life scholar, he is connected to it via his philosophy teacher 
Nishida Kitar# 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945), who was part of the =eld.
With regard to “religion,” Miki says that while he was in>uenced by Nishida Tenk# 
西田天香 (1872–1968) and Kurata Hyakuz# 倉田百三 (1891–1943), this was tempo-
rary. However, this explanation alone risks a misunderstanding; elsewhere in Miki’s 
explanation of his reading history, he describes his involvement with Shin Buddhism 
from a very young age, as well as his thoughts and feelings as a First Higher School 
student regarding Chikazumi J#kan. Miki’s relationship with religion must be under-
stood while keeping in mind the following:
I was originally raised in a Shin household, and at some point ended up 
memorizing the Sh#shinge 正信偈 and Gobunsh# 御文章 that my grandfather 
4 Found in “Dokusho henreki” 読書遍歴, Miki Kiyoshi zensh" (hereafter MKZS) 1: 401–4.
5 MKZS 1: 401. 
6 MKZS 1: 402.
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and grandmother, as well as my father and mother, would recite. Some-
times, doing as I was told, I would sit in front of our home altar and recite 
them as well. In our area, reading scripture was a part of basic education. 
Perhaps due to the in>uence of such a childhood, since I was a young man, 
Shin Buddhism caught my interest the most. !is has not changed even 
today. . . . When I was in high school I read for the =rst time, and was 
particularly impressed by, the Tannish#. Chikazumi J#kan-sensei’s Tannish# 
k#gi 歎異鈔講義 [Lectures on the Tannish#] is also a book that I cannot 
forget. I have also heard him give lectures on the Tannish# at the Ky$d# 
Gakusha in Hong# Morikawa. It appears that Chikazumi-sensei had a great 
in>uence on some young people during this era.7
In other words, from when he was a young man to when he wrote the above, Miki was 
most attracted to Shin Buddhism, and Chikazumi was a representative Shin Buddhist 
=gure when he was a young man.
Karaki Junz#’s essay “Gendaishi e no kokoromi” 現代史への試み (Towards an 
Account of Modern History) gives us a good idea of the relationship between young 
intellectuals and Chikazumi during this era.8 Karaki’s article is a classic piece analyzing 
Taish#-period ky#y#shugi. !erein, Miki serves as the example of an intellectual liv-
ing within this broader trend. Karaki says that there was a “model” for the generation 
that preceded Miki, members of which included Uchimura Kanz#, Mori "gai 森鴎外 
(1862–1922), Natsume S#seki 夏目漱石 (1867–1916), Nishida Kitar#, and Nagai Kaf$ 
永井荷風 (1879–1959).9 While Karaki does not list Chikazumi J#kan, as is clear from 
Miki’s relationship with him, Chikazumi occupied the same place as these =gures. 
Karaki argues that this generation, which was born around the time of the Meiji Resto-
ration (1868), lived through the contradictions and con>icts between Western moder-
nity and Japan while having a “model” in mind that came from Confucianism and 
bushid# 武士道. In contrast, Miki’s generation was a “model-less” one: its members did 
not have a pattern based on which to shape the self, says Karaki.10 !ey thought that, 
rather than following only a speci=c teacher or classical text, it was important to learn 
freely from a variety of sources, and that this would cultivate their “individuality” (kosei 
個性) and lead to the formation of their character. Having grown up in an area where 
Shin Buddhism >ourished, Miki was familiar with its ethos, yet it still had a premod-
ern hue. However, Chikazumi, who had reconstructed Shin Buddhism in a modern 
fashion, was proselytizing in Tokyo’s Hong# area. For this reason, Miki and others 
7 MKZS 1: 383–84.
8 In Karaki 1963.
9 Karaki 1963, p. 35.
10 Karaki 1963, p. 25.
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were able to take in the familiar Shin Buddhism with fresh eyes as a valid choice, equal 
to philosophy and Christianity, which could contribute to the formation of their 
“individuality.” While there is a need to separately examine whether Miki’s generation 
was in fact completely unconnected to such models from the Edo period,11 there is no 
doubt that Miki was a young adult during Taish#-period ky#y#shugi and learned a con-
siderable amount from the generation that preceded him, and also that he then came 
to question the foundations of humanism. !is issue relates to Miki’s “Nietzschean 
task,” which I will discuss later in this essay. 
In this way, Miki took in the academic =eld of philosophy along with the mixture 
of various elements included under the heading of “humanism,” and would spend his 
life as a philosopher. In the context of his chosen =eld, he would thoroughly investi-
gate the various issues included in this humanism. In other words, when he =rst began 
to engage in research on philosophy, he encountered both philosophy as well as non-
philosophical elements, and he would end up repeatedly examining these non-philo-
sophical elements in his philosophical contemplations. Herein “religion” occupied a 
special position.
His personal notes (“Shuki”) that he wrote in 1930 at Toyotama 豊多摩 Prison 
addressed to the prosecutors handling his case capture his basic approach to religion. 
!ese notes were written in particularly unusual circumstances: in detention after hav-
ing been arrested based on the Peace Preservation Laws for providing =nancial assis-
tance to the Communist Party. However, with that said, they have a similar orientation 
as the critique of religion he wrote immediately before his arrest, which was published 
in Ch"gai nipp# 中外日報.12 It appears that they do not contradict the content of his 
writings or the development of his thought but rather clearly express his intellectual 
position.
In these notes, Miki says that he has lived his life as a scholar aiming to con-
struct his own philosophy: “My path has been one of continually seeking my own 
philosophy.”13 He then lists “Nishida’s philosophy,” “Heidegger’s philosophy,” and 
“Marxism” as things he encountered while forming his own philosophy. While they 
may have captivated him temporarily, they were only part of what he encountered on 
his “philosophical journey.” After presenting his standpoint in this way, he declares, “I 
11 Tsutsui Kiyotada, after pointing out that Karaki’s outstanding article established the general 
outlines for research on Taish#-period ky#y#shugi that remain current today, raises doubts about the 
typological schema positing a shift from Meiji-period (1868–1912) sh"y#shugi 修養主義 (moral culti-
vation) to Taish#-period ky#y#shugi, and proposes modifying Karaki’s schema based on a more detailed 
analysis. However, he does recognize that Karaki’s schema is convincing as a basic way of looking at 
the change from the “Meiji person” to the “Taish# person.” See Tsutsui 1995, ch. 1.
12 MKZS 13: 8.
13 MKZS 18: 100.
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am a human who inherently has a religious tendency,”14 and asserts that this “religious 
feeling of mine is one of the things that ultimately makes it impossible for me to be 
a Marxist.”15 In other words, on the one hand, he asserts that while he encountered 
outstanding philosophical thought as he formed his own philosophy, since he was 
primarily concerned with this task, speci=c kinds of philosophical thought never 
became his own philosophy. On the other hand, he also confesses that he has a deep 
religious tendency, and that it is this tendency which made it impossible for him to 
be a Marxist.
Miki also describes an important religion-related perspective of his, namely, a focus 
on “societal elements” and “natural elements.” He states the following:
I think that while religion is clearly societal and therefore has class con-
straints, it is similarly deeply rooted in human nature itself. In order to =nd 
out about the depth of such “natural” roots of religion, one should just read 
books that are the confessions of the souls of great religionists: Augustine, 
Luther, Pascal. And Shinran.16
Miki then clearly states that religion has two kinds of directions or elements, that is, 
“societal elements” and “natural elements.”17
In his article published slightly earlier in the newspaper Ch"gai nipp#, which focuses 
on religion, the strong interest in religion that Miki revealed in his notes to the pros-
ecution is described from a perspective critical of religion. Miki states that when con-
sidering humans as a whole, religion always emerges as an issue: “Insofar as humans 
are not machines, the issue of religion is included in human existence itself.”18 At the 
foundation of human existence are “religious elements,” and the issue of religion is “not 
something that will go away with the advent of an exploitation-free classless society.”19 
However, this does not mean that he approved of religion as it existed at the time. 
He asserts that religion should be dialectically rea<rmed after having been rejected. 
!en, he says that if people arrive at “true religion” (shin no sh"ky# 真の宗教) by delv-
ing deeper in the direction of pathos, they will be reborn as “creative spirits” (s#z#teki 
seishin 創造的精神） and prepare a new culture.
If humans truly arrive at religion, then they must be reborn as creative 
spirits. If today the vast majority of people are in the process of becoming 
14 MKZS 18: 104.
15 MKZS 18: 104.
16 MKZS 18: 110.
17 MKZS 18: 111.
18 MKZS 13: 8.
19 MKZS 13: 8.
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deeply engaged in pathos, then this is signi=cant in that this is approaching 
the source of the rebirth of humans. !e creative spirit is essentially not the 
same as the cultural spirit (productive spirit) and is a denial of culture. Yet, 
it also serves as the fountainhead of cultural creation. Today, based on this 
[creative spirit], old culture must be denied, and the path towards a new cul-
ture prepared.20
Before his arrest, Miki clearly stated that religion is indispensable to human exis-
tence, as well as that he expects it to play a major role in society. Religion had a weight 
in Miki’s philosophical thought incomparable with its other non-philosophical ele-
ments.
Miki’s Philosophy of Religion and Work on Pascal
Miki’s handwritten “Katararezaru tetsugaku” 語られざる哲学 (!e Unspoken Philoso-
phy) provides an excellent glimpse into his intellectual approach after he had begun to 
engage in the full->edged study of philosophy under Nishida Kitar# at Kyoto Imperial 
University. After having identi=ed the place of religion in Miki’s philosophy based on 
this manuscript, I will consider his Pasukaru ni okeru ningen no kenky" パスカルに於け
る人間の研究 (Pascal’s Research on Humanity; 1926) as the concrete materialization of 
this philosophy.
Miki completed “Katararezaru tetsugaku” in July of 1919, when he had =nished his 
second year at Kyoto Imperial University (unlike today in Japan, the new academic 
year began in September). It spanned approximately one hundred =fty handwritten 
manuscript pages and is included in the eighteenth volume of his complete works.21 
It is not an academic article. Rather, Miki wrote down his own aspirations and resolu-
tions as someone living as a philosopher. Its logical development is inadequate, there 
are many grand youthful locutions, and his expression of his intellectual position is 
unre=ned. However, one can thus all the more glimpse the beginnings of his ideas. 
Above all, we =nd what would become the basic pattern for his ideas regarding the 
relationship between religion and philosophy.
Miki states that “unspoken philosophy” is at the basis of normal philosophy: “At the 
basis of spoken philosophy is unspoken philosophy.”22 Miki’s aim in this paper was to 
render visible what was foundational and make clear his position as a philosopher.
What is “unspoken philosophy”? “Confession is unspoken philosophy.”23 He =rst 
states that the non-philosophical, religious element of “confession” is the fundamental 
20 MKZS 13: 30.
21 MKZS 18: 1–93.
22 MKZS 18: 35.
23 MKZS 18: 3.
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principle of philosophy and that philosophy comes into existence by making confes-
sion its foundation. Miki holds that in “unspoken philosophy” the “good life” and the 
problems of “form” and “content” (the necessary constraints of this good life) emerge 
as issues.24 Miki then asks himself whether or not such issues have been examined 
in classical ethics. He answers that while classical ethics has been satis=ed with logical 
consistency and indispensable knowledge regarding the good life, his own “unspoken 
philosophy” is di;erent in that it emphasizes “ordinary life” more than knowledge.25 
Miki, quoting Tolstoy’s My Confession, asserts that “unspoken philosophy” is based on 
“the belief that knowledge regarding truth can only be obtained by living.”26 
While it goes without saying that “confession” would become an important concept 
in the philosophy of Tanabe Hajime 田辺元 (1885–1962), here Miki is using it over 
twenty years earlier.27 While Miki does not specify where he has gotten the word “confes-
sion” from, one of the books he did have in mind was Tolstoy’s My Confession. However, 
that is not all. Judging from his statement, “It is precisely because we, with [our] tremen-
dous transgressions and evil as well as [our] blazing delusions exist, that the extent of the 
Buddha’s great compassion and great vow becomes more and more apparent,”28 as well as 
his quotation from the thirteenth chapter of the Tannish#,29 it appears that another source 
of his thought was Chikazumi’s bestseller Zangeroku 懺悔録 (Confession Record).
In this manuscript the philosophical issues into which Miki would later deeply delve 
are presented in a rough form. One example is the issue that he would subsequently 
formulate as “the problem of the uni=cation of logos and pathos.” In this manuscript 
Miki discusses it with regard to the issue of humans as beings that exist between “real-
ity and ideal” or “lightness and darkness.” He rather hastily concludes that in order 
“to make the good life possible,” the “existence of an absolute being” is necessary.30 
Importantly, this need for the “existence of an absolute being” is not a postulate based 
on rational inference but instead given irrationally or by religious belief.
I am con=dent that the solution to the problem [of how it is possible to 
live the good life] is in the end given not rationally but irrationally, or not 
24 MKZS 18: 7.
25 MKZS 18: 8.
26 MKZS 18: 8.
27 However, Miki was not the =rst to use “confession” as a key philosophical concept. Nozaki 
Hiroyoshi 野崎広義 (1889–1919), a pupil of Nishida Kitar#, had already written an essay entitled 
“Zange toshite no tetsugaku” 懺悔としての哲学 (Philosophy as Confession) in December 1916, and 
was preparing to publish it in Tetsugaku kenky" 哲学研究 (Philosophy Research). Nozaki’s article 
would later be included in his 1942 Zange toshite no tetsugaku, which featured an introduction by 
Nishida.
28 MKZS 18: 59.
29 MKZS 18: 72–73.
30 MKZS 18: 63–64.
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by logic but religious belief, and that such lived religious belief is acquired 
not by simple conceptual thought but by actually living the good life.31
In this way, Miki’s “unspoken philosophy” takes the position of philosophy that 
emphasizes ordinary life and searches therein for a point from which to be involved 
with religion.
If we consider that Miki was engaged in such a search, then the aim of his gradua-
tion thesis becomes clear. Miki =nished an article entitled “Hihan tetsugaku to rekishi 
tetsugaku” 批判哲学と歴史哲学 (Critical Philosophy and Historical Philosophy) in 
March 1920. He then modi=ed and published it in the journal Tetsugaku kenky" 哲学
研究 (Philosophy Research) in July of the same year. Unlike his manuscript “Katara-
rezaru tetsugaku,” it is a piece of research on the history of philosophy. It investigates 
the relationship between enlightenment thought and German Idealism within the 
framework of research on Kant. In short, he is trying from within Kantian philosophy 
to make clear the turning points from natural science to history and from the abstract 
universal to the concrete universal. In this article, in which his thought shows clear 
development, he philosophically investigates the meaning of “freedom” and “individu-
ality,” which he had not touched upon in “Katararezaru tetsugaku.” Miki understands 
real-world freedom as having the potential for both good and evil, and argues that this 
freedom is historical freedom, namely, freedom that gives new things within history. 
He then states that religious belief lays the foundation for historical progress: “!e 
ultimate meaning of historical activity is con=rmed by pure religious belief. !e =nal 
problem of the philosophy of history is the acquisition in philosophy of religion of the 
stability of a solution.”32 In this way, here Miki philosophically >eshes out the “good 
life” that he had discussed in “Katararezaru tetsugaku.” Also, while he uses concepts 
from Kantian philosophy, he is philosophically working out the relationship between 
the good life and religious belief. Considering the philosophical interest of Miki dur-
ing his younger days, it was actually quite natural for his =rst published book to have 
been research on Pascal. Let us now turn to his Pasukaru ni okeru ningen no kenky".
In 1922, Miki, with the support of Iwanami Shigeo, went to study in Europe. In 
Marburg, he attended a young Heidegger’s seminar on Aristotle and was attracted to 
Heidegger’s phenomenological method. Iwanami Shoten happened to have been plan-
ning to publish a series of critical biographies of philosophers (Tetsujin s#sho 哲人 
叢書), and Miki was asked to write one on Aristotle. While he planned to do so, in the 
end this did not happen. In April 1924, he moved to Paris where he wrote an article 
on Pascal. He became immersed in his Pascal research to the extent that he would 
write a letter stating, “Right now it is impossible for me to do anything but study 
31 MKZS 18: 36.
32 MKZS 2: 48.
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Pascal.”33 Until going to Paris, Miki had read Descartes and Bergson to an extent, and 
had planned to continue his research on them in Paris. Shortly after arriving, though, 
he wrote a letter to Iwanami Shigeo stating that he planned to study Maine de Biran 
(1766–1824).34 However, after happening to pick up a copy of Pensées, it captured 
him.35 Miki would then work to construct his own philosophy of religion through his 
research on Pascal. 
Miki discussed Pensées from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. While 
recognizing, of course, that it is a religious work, he decides to discuss it in terms of 
its relationship to human beings.36 To do so, he adopts the “interpretive” method of 
“making clear the basic experience of a given concept, and the concept of a given basic 
experience.”37 
Following Pascal, Miki discusses human beings in terms of the three “orders” of 
body, mind, and charity, to which correspond sense, reason/esprit, and heart/religion. 
In other words, in Miki’s work on Pascal, he discusses how to understand “life” as a 
whole, which he would subsequently refer to in various ways (such as the “uni=cation 
of logos and pathos”), in terms of the three “orders.” He states the following:
Religion does not go against sense and reason, in fact, it is an even higher, 
more >exible standpoint that subsumes and unites these things. Only 
within the order of religion is it possible to understand the whole of human 
existence without remainder. !e way of understanding within this order 
is both contemplative and practice-oriented. A complete understanding of 
life is only possible from the perspective of a life in which “knowing” and 
“doing” are together and mutually inclusive.38
In this work Miki presents philosophical inquiry and religion as being very con-
nected. Following Pascal, he asserts that philosophy is incomplete in and of itself and 
requires religion as a historically existing fact. Philosophers cannot replace religion 
with philosophy. !is is because philosophy belongs to one of the human orders, and 
“is nothing other than the way of looking at life that is limited by the way of under-
33 MKZS 19: 300. Emphasis in this and subsequent quotations is found in the original.
34 Letter dated October 19, 1924 to Iwanami Shigeo in Iida 2003, pp. 275–76. However, we can 
see that he had an interest in Maine de Biran from an early stage; for example, Miki quotes him in 
“Y$j#: K#ry# seikatsu kaiko no issetsu” 友情：向陵生活回顧の一節 (Friendship: A Re>ection on Life 
at the First Higher School), which he wrote right before graduating from the First Higher School 
(MKZS 19: 34).
35 MKZS 1: 429.
36 MKZS 1: 4.
37 MKZS 1: 5.
38 MKZS 1: 120–21.
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standing unique to this order.”39 Philosophy is limited to showing the conditions in 
which God’s revelation is realized and is only complete when it connects to religion 
that exists in history: “Esprit cannot complete the dialectic of the interpretation of life. 
!is dialectic demands a secondary interpretation of life. !is is provided by religion. 
. . . !e dialectic is complete only when one arrives at the religious interpretation.”40
Insofar as this passage is concerned, Miki’s understanding of Pascal generally falls 
within the already existing research on Pascal, as well as the framework of philosophi-
cal research inspired by him in France at the time. It is di<cult to identify anything 
particularly original. However, in Miki’s understanding of Pascal we can indeed =nd 
some expression of his own philosophical position. I will make this point clear by 
comparing his understanding of Pascal with those of French philosophers.
When Miki took an interest in Pascal, research on Pascal in France was >ourishing to 
the extent that a work would later be published entitled !e Revival of Pascal.41 Émile 
Boutroux (1845–1921), Léon Brunschvicg (1869–1944), Maurice Blondel (1861–
1949), Jules Lachelier (1832–1918), and others successively published monographs on 
Pascal or philosophical works and articles that took Pascal as a source of inspiration.42
Ahead of his time, Maine de Biran presented from a philosophical standpoint a 
theory of human beings that would =nd its way into Pascal’s thought. Biran’s theory of 
human beings became one model for French philosophical anthropology. In Nouveaux 
essais d’anthropologie, Biran presents three modes of life in di;erent dimensions: animal 
life, human life, and spiritual life.43 Here we should note that Biran argues that reli-
gion is necessary for human beings, as well as that, even when discussing the human 
state, he does not take up the problem of the historicity of revelation or Jesus Christ.
!e philosopher Lachelier wrote a research article on Pascal and philosophically 
re=ned Biran’s philosophical anthropology. Miki himself referred to Lachelier’s work.44 
However, Miki deals with issues that go beyond the scope of Lachelier’s philosophy, 
and it is here we =nd Miki’s uniqueness. According to Lachelier, Pascal’s wager is not 
39 MKZS 1: 119.
40 MKZS 1: 159–60.
41 Eastwood 1936.
42 For details regarding the philosophies of Biran, Lachelier, Blondel, and Bergson, see Iwata 2001.
43 While there are editorial problems in Nouveaux essais d’anthropologie, here I am using the Naville 
version that was circulating in Paris at the time Miki stayed there. According to this work, the appear-
ance of the ego distinguishes “animal life” and “human life.” However, “human life” is given to 
humans for them to ennoble themselves to the “spiritual life.” It is only here that human beings are 
liberated from the yoke of emotions and pathos, are =lled with an inexplainable feeling, and are able 
to experience complete serenity and pleasant peace. While e;ort is indispensable in order to arrive 
at the “spiritual life,” ultimately one can only reach it via grace. “Spiritual life” is the pure accepting 
state under the in>uence of something greater than human beings that follows active e;ort, and only 
Christianity has been able to reveal it.
44 MKZS 1: 66.
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  1 ,  122
an either/or situation in which one must choose or not choose God as a logical pos-
sibility. In this wager, the existence of God, eternal life, and the renunciation of self-
love are inseparable. In other words, to wager that God exists is a practical a<rmation: 
renouncing self-love and choosing a life suited for pure happiness as one’s way of 
living. !is is the wager presented to human beings; while freedom does not actu-
ally become a reality and remains ideal, humans must respond practically. However, 
according to Lachelier, when the mind (ideal freedom) acts on reality, there is no har-
mony between form and matter, and there is an inconsistency which we can describe 
as being practically a “contradiction.” He then explains from a philosophical perspec-
tive the necessity of the wager.
Lachelier and Pascal are the same in that they look to religion when understanding 
human beings holistically. However, Miki takes a dimension not covered by Lachelier 
as the subject of his discussion, namely, the issue of Jesus Christ’s death/resurrection 
and original sin. While these problems are normally covered in the academic =eld of 
theology, Miki discusses them from the perspective of the “interpretation of life” in 
philosophical anthropology. When doing so Miki focuses on the concept of the )gura-
tif / signe. He declares, “!e concept of the )guratif / signe is indispensable when religion 
interprets existence.”45 Miki explains the concept of )guratif / signe and asserts that that 
which is signi=ed in religion relates to “truth.” He then attempts to justify his own 
philosophical method.
Here we should note what it is that Miki is trying to elucidate using this method. 
From the perspective that the interpretation of religious signs is both practice-oriented 
as well as teleological, Miki =rst makes clear the signi=cance of original sin and then 
of Jesus Christ. First, he asserts that from the truth of original sin, the reason for the 
confusing contradiction of “greatness and misery in human existence” is made clear.46 
!en, he states that from the truth of Jesus Christ, “the principle that integrates the 
contradiction of human existence” is made clear.47 Here Miki says that Jesus Christ is 
“God, person,” and “redeemer,” as well as saying, “Only in his personhood is Christ’s 
death on the cross integrated together with his resurrection based on death itself.”48 
!ese normally fall within the scope of theology and are not topics discussed by phi-
losophy. However, Miki engaged with these issues entirely as a philosopher. !is does 
not mean that he did not di;erentiate between philosophy and theology: he does so 
not in terms of content but method. Since early modern times, philosophy and theol-
ogy have often been distinguished in terms of their territory, but Miki tried to do so in 
terms of their method.
45 MKZS 1: 171.
46 MKZS 1: 182.
47 MKZS 1: 187.
48 MKZS 1: 184.
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!ere was one French philosopher who tried to do the same before Miki: Maurice 
Blondel. Blondel’s 1893 L’action is a major work of French philosophy of religion. It 
used Biran’s ideas about human beings as a model and also tried to philosophically 
address Pascal’s wager. L’action presents the transcendent as the only thing necessary for 
humans, and pushes readers to choose whether to accept it. It discusses the “completion 
of action” after having accepted this, and also covers doctrines, rules, and rituals that 
provide concrete norms for human action. !en, Blondel recognizes the signi=cance 
of the tradition and the historical nature of the church that transmits these doctrines, 
rules, and rituals. While this work led to a major debate between theologians and phi-
losophers, Blondel, as a philosopher, was himself attempting to explore the conditions 
that should obtain between human beings and God from the perspective of overcom-
ing the imbalance of the will and from the perspective of the conditions for human 
action. Unlike theology, he does not start from the position that a supernatural “gift” 
(don) actually exists. He posits its existence merely as a hypothesis and attempts to 
focus entirely upon human action. While philosophy of religion is sometimes thought 
to be philosophy that takes the place of religion, this is not the case for Blondel’s and 
Miki’s philosophies.
Of course, Miki’s “interpretation of life” and Blondel’s “dialectic of the will” di;er 
in terms of philosophical method. However, the philosophical personalities of the two 
thinkers are similar in that they tried to di;erentiate between philosophy and theology 
not in terms of content but methodology. With the same approach as that taken when 
researching Sanskrit instructional books or Mongolian customs (to use an expression 
from L’action),49 Miki discussed as philosophical anthropology the Christian doctrines 
covered by Pascal. Like Blondel, Miki’s philosophy of religion as expressed in his work 
on Pascal is essentially mediatory and is brought to completion by the existence of reli-
gion in history. In the concluding portion of Miki’s work on Pascal, we =nd an impor-
tant passage that clearly expresses this.
Life naturally bears a nature that is not fully understood by purely imma-
nent analysis. !e understanding of life can only be complete when it is 
understood in relation to the transcendent. Herein lies the deepest mys-
tery of life. While it goes without saying that this transcendent entity is 
at the same time immanent, it cannot be perceived by the esprit because it 
is supernatural as a whole. !e limit of an immanent interpretation of life 
is, in the end, the limit of the philosophy of life itself. Philosophy, by its 
nature, can establish the transcendent. However, for life as a whole this is 
entirely abstract and it cannot become the concrete truth of life. It is reason-
able for there to be limitations to philosophy. !is is because philosophy is 
49 Blondel (1893) 1950, p. 391.
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nothing more than something that belongs to a single order of life as one 
mode of existence in life. Religion, which is located in an even higher order 
of life, fully interprets human existence. !is is not by bending the facts of 
life but, rather, by making one understand their meaning and connections 
in keeping with the reality of life.50 
Based on the methodology he learned under Heidegger, Miki engaged in research 
on Pascal, a popular subject at the time. Here we =nd Miki’s ability to swiftly grasp 
current issues and develop them in the context of his own contemplations. However, 
he did not simply chase after trends. I want to emphasize that Miki found something 
in Pascal which resonated with his own philosophical interest and that his preexisting 
concerns took shape in his work on Pascal, in which he explored a philosophy of reli-
gion that could make possible a “good life” for all human beings. 
Two Issues in K#s#ryoku no ronri
After =nishing his studies in Europe and returning to Japan, Miki would actively 
write on a variety of topics, and we no longer =nd works that are primarily on religion 
itself. However, we could also say that Miki, deepening his ideas regarding history and 
society, was expanding his focus in order to construct his own philosophy of religion. 
Miki deepened his thinking regarding at least two philosophical issues that he had 
not considered when working on Pascal. His essay “Shinran” can be seen as a work of 
philosophy of religion that was supposed to provide an answer to these issues. One of 
these was involvement with societal realities, and the other was what he referred to as 
the “Nietzschean task.” Let us consider how he presented them when writing his major 
late-period work K#s#ryoku no ronri 構想力の論理 (!e Logic of Imagination).
K#s#ryoku no ronri draws from Kant’s “imagination” to solve the issue of the uni=ca-
tion or integration of the logos-like and the pathos-like. However, constructing a logic 
for this was not easy. One di<cultly grew out of Miki’s increased focus on societal 
reality. In the =rst chapter of K#s#ryoku no ronri entitled “Shinwa” 神話 (Myth), Miki 
actively refers to contemporary Western research on myth theory. In this context, he 
presents the Ré*exions sur la violence by Georges Sorel (1847–1922), a work which 
connects myth as a historical force to action. Following this French socialist, Miki says 
that while socialist revolutions and general strikes are contemporary myths, unlike a 
utopia that projects things of the past into the future, they have historical creativity.51
Sorel looks to Bergson’s philosophy prior to L’évolution créatrice as one of the sources 
of his thought. However, Sorel’s above reading is di;erent from Bergson’s position, at 
50 MKZS 1: 190–91.
51 MKZS 8: 47–48. Miki is referring to Sorel 2007, vol. 1, p. 221.
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least as found in Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion. Furthermore, while Miki 
incorporates Sorel’s ideas regarding myth into his own logic, he does not actively do 
the same with those of Bergson. It appears that this was intentional; in Tetsugakuteki 
ningengaku 哲学的人間学 (Philosophical Anthropology), written immediately before 
K#s#ryoku no ronri, Miki criticizes the society presented in Les deux sources as “abstract” 
and not depicting “concrete human existence.”52 !e analysis of static religion in Les 
deux sources and the analysis of myths in K#s#ryoku no ronri are very similar in how 
they connect issues, and they also both refer to and touch upon the same texts and 
scholars. However, Bergson saw imagination as a kind of necessary evil and discussed 
static religion. !en, not stopping there, Bergson turns to dynamic religion that takes 
Christian mystics as a model. He says that mystics return to the fundamental principle 
of life, encounter the creative e;ort that runs throughout the universe, and, having 
done so, then turn to act in the real world.
While Sorel recognizes the existence of historical creativity in myths, Bergson 
distinguishes between that which gives rise to myths and that which forms the core 
of creativity. Bergson sees “love” as forming the essence of creative e;ort, but calls 
our attention to the existence of two qualitatively di;erent kinds of “love.” He then 
links these two kinds of love to “open society” and “closed society.” !is distinction 
does not mesh with Sorel’s position in Ré*exions sur la violence that looks to “those 
myths in which all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a party, or of a class are 
discovered.”53 Miki, probably aware of this, decided that he could use Sorel’s theory 
of myths, but not that of Bergson, in his own work. !is was probably because Miki 
had determind that the act of turning to the real world that Bergson emphasized in 
his writing on “dynamic religion” was in fact “abstract.” Miki thought that one had to 
investigate forms of human life that would more concretely connect to societal real-
ity. In his writing on Pascal, Miki presented a uni=ed theory of human beings and 
discussed the relationship between human beings and religion. However, the life of a 
human found therein is an individual one, and Miki did not pay much attention to its 
relationship with actual society. It appears that Miki’s deepened awareness of societal 
reality was one of the major background elements to his reconstruction of philosophy 
of religion, and also was one of the reasons that this reconstruction was di<cult. !is 
di<culty was further increased by his “Nietzschean task.”
When Nietzsche interrogated the basis of Europe’s value system, he had to con-
front the issue of Christianity; his nihilism inquired into the historical genealogy of 
these values. While Nietzsche interrogated Christianity, Miki would criticize “nature” 
(shizen 自然) which he saw as being at the basis of Japan’s value system. Miki came 
52 MKZS 18: 380–81.
53 Sorel 1908, p. 216.
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to discuss the “Nietzschean task” from the perspective of “humanism’s fundamental 
demand for the rebirth of human beings.”54 !is “Nietzschean task” was, for Miki, 
a “critique of Oriental peoples.”55 It was in this way that Miki adopted Nietzsche’s 
interrogation into the basis of the values of Western thought for his own project. In 
his 1936 article “Hy$manizumu no gendaiteki igi” ヒューマニズムの現代的意義 (!e 
Contemporary Meaning of Humanism), Miki states the following:
Incidentally, the issue of tradition today appears particularly as the issue 
of cultivation through education. While cultivation through education is 
no doubt an issue that humanism should regard as important, at the same 
time one must fundamentally grasp it from the viewpoint of the issue of 
the rebirth of human beings. . . . One must be cautious with regard to 
cultivation through education becoming a new form of escape for the intel-
lectual class.
 In this way, we encounter the issue of the critique of Oriental peoples, 
which is arrived at in the context of humanism’s fundamental insistence 
on the rebirth of human beings. We can call this the “Nietzschean task.” 
!ere is a need to critique Oriental peoples with the same enthusiasm as 
that of Nietzsche when he critiqued Western, Christian ones. Of course, it 
is impossible for the method and conclusion of this critique to be the same. 
However, we cannot lack the same humanistic spirit as him. !oroughly 
carrying out this Nietzschean task is a necessary premise for the future 
development of our culture.56
Generally speaking, it appears that there are two parts to this “Nietzschean task”: 
the interrogation of the basis of the Western value system and the interrogation of Jap-
anese values. Miki does not take up the former but questions the basis of the Japanese 
value system. Miki recasts the Nietzschean task as a criticism of the Eastern ideology of 
naturalism.
Our problem must be working on this issue in a self-aware fashion and 
intensely =ghting Oriental “nature.” Becoming aware of this problem is par-
ticularly important considering that there is always too much unconscious 
compromise with traditional naturalism. In the West, Nietzsche cried “God 
is dead!” Should we similarly cry “Nature is dead!” in the Orient?57
54 I have found Tsuda 2007 helpful in understanding Miki’s “Nietzschean task.”
55 MKZS 13: 284.
56 MKZS 13: 283–84.
57 MKZS 12: 229–30. However, in Shin Nihon no shis# genri 新日本の思想原理 (New Japan’s Fun-
damental Principles of !ought; published under the name of the Sh#wa Kenky$kai 昭和研究会 in 
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For Miki, to present a critique of the East’s traditional naturalism involved raising 
di<cult issues; it was to critically interrogate his own footing. !is “Nietzschean task” 
meant not simply that the humanism of Taish#-period ky#y#shugi that Miki took in 
during his younger days was insu<cient, but that the very foundation of this human-
ism was not =rm. His statement in “Ningen no j#ken ni tsuite” 人間の条件について 
(On the Human Condition) that his “self ” is >oating on “nothingness” (kyomu 
虚無) is an expression of this problem.58 Considering that the foundation of his self 
was not =rm, the issue emerged for Miki of how to produce a new humanism. Miki 
began working on K#s#ryoku no ronri in order to do so.
After completing his work, he re>ects that his logic was in the end a “logic of form” 
(katachi no ronri 形の論理), writing the following in the introduction to its =rst vol-
ume (1939), which contained articles on the logic of imagination that he had previ-
ously published in the journal Shis# 思想 (!ought): “My thought regarding ‘the logic 
of imagination’—a subjective expression, so to speak—has reached tentative stability 
by =nding ‘the logic of form’—an objective expression, so to speak.”59 Miki holds that 
this “form” arises out of “nothingness,” and ends up expressing “life” (seimei 生命) as 
the “formative power from nothingness.”60 In other words, he understands human life 
as forming a set along with “nothingness.” He states that the self is >oating “on noth-
ingness,” and conversely, because nothingness comprises the human condition, he even 
states that self-formation is possible therein.
Miki explains his “logic of imagination” in relation to this kind of self-formation 
out of nothingness. !e “logic of imagination” is characterized by a “coalescent 
dialectic.”61 !is “coalescent dialectic” is an assembly of “indeterminate things” that 
are indistinct, and the basis of these “indeterminate things” is not solid and therefore 
can be described as “the being of nothingness.” In this sense, all things exist within 
nothingness, and it is where they—each possessing its own unique nothingness—
coalesce that “new forms” are born. Miki sees the biggest issue in this context as “how 
form can be created out of the formless.”62 He states that this problem is not solved 
from an immanent perspective and thus something “transcendent” is necessary.63 !is 
January 1939), Miki approvingly discusses “nature” as that which is the basis of Eastern humanism 
(MKZS 17: 514). While it is certain that the “Nietzschean task” was part of a major current in Miki’s 
thought that would develop into his “Shinran,” it is a fact that there are points still requiring elucida-
tion in his later thought, such as his participation in the Sh#wa Kenky$kai and going to Manila as a 
member of the army’s propaganda team.
58 MKZS 1: 254. 
59 MKZS 8: 6.
60 MKZS 1: 254.
61 MKZS 1: 259–60.
62 MKZS 1: 259.
63 MKZS 1: 259.
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is because he thought that the absence in modern times of a model to regulate human 
life arose due to the fact that individual, substantially existing entities had been dis-
solved into in=nite interrelationality and lost their individual determinate nature. 
Miki’s concern with this absence of “form” was probably in the background of his writ-
ing about the “non-observance of the precepts” (mukai 無戒) in “Shinran.”
At any rate, K#s#ryoku no ronri was written after Miki turned to the issue of the 
foundation for values. !erefore, even though the uni=cation of the logos-like and 
the pathos-like still needs to be addressed, the way in which they unify had become a 
much more di<cult problem than when he wrote his work on Pascal. While taking the 
Nietzschean task as his own personal task, at the same time he emphasized its relation-
ship to societal reality, and thought that he would be able to consider the important 
realities of human beings and society by reference to “religion.” It was with this focus 
that he began working on “Shinran.”
Miki’s Reliance on Takeuchi Yoshinori’s Ky#gy#shinsh# no tetsugaku
“Shinran” is not a confession of religious belief. Just as Miki had considered the rela-
tionship between human beings and religion in Pasukaru ni okeru ningen no kenky", 
in “Shinran” he tried to philosophically consider the mode of human life grasped by 
Shinran. Miki spoke of its close relationship to his work on Pascal as follows:
I went to Kyoto to study with Nishida Kitar#-sensei. During my years 
in high school I was most deeply in>uenced by his Zen no kenky" 善の 
研究 (An Inquiry into the Good  ). I was wondering what to do, and this work 
made me decide to do philosophy. Another work was the Tannish#. Still today 
it is a bedside book of mine. Despite the recent popularity of Zen, in my 
case, this common person’s J#do Shin Buddhism is what gives rise to religious 
feeling in me. I think that I will probably die based on this religious belief. 
Later, from around the time I wrote Pasukaru ni okeru ningen no kenky" at 
my boarding house in Paris when I was twenty-nine, trying to write about 
Shinran’s religion using the same kind of method never left my mind.64
While a limited number of scholars have discussed “Shinran,” there is one fact 
that has been overlooked by them: its central content relies on Takeuchi Yoshinori’s 
Ky#gy#shinsh# no tetsugaku 教行信証の哲学 (!e Philosophy of the Ky#gy#shinsh#). In 
order to acquire this work by Takeuchi, who would subsequently become a professor 
of religious studies at Kyoto University, Miki went so far as to write a letter to some-
one in the publishing industry requesting it. In this letter, dated June 6, 1944 to Izawa 
K#hei 伊澤幸平 (d.u.) of the publisher S#gensha 創元社, Miki wrote the following:
64 MKZS 1: 364.
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 I am sorry about the other day. How have you been since then? 
 !ere is a book about Shinran that came out, perhaps last year, from 
K#bund# 弘文堂. Is there any way that you could get hold of it? If it is dif-
=cult to get, do you know anyone who has it? I would like to borrow it and 
give it a read. Just one week would be =ne. If it is possible, could you take 
care of this? I have also been writing little by little about Shinran recently. I 
am not sure when I will =nish, but I intend to research a lot [about him]. I 
hope that you can help me.65
While he does not explicitly mention Takeuchi’s name, at least judging from the 
holdings of the National Diet Library, it appears that the only book published by 
K#bund# during this time related to Shinran was that of Takeuchi. !us, Miki was 
asking for Takeuchi’s Ky#gy#shinsh# no tetsugaku. !e circumstances by which Miki 
found out about this work are unclear. Published in 1941, it is a collection of articles 
that originally appeared in the journal Tetsugaku kenky", so it is possible that Miki 
had already read them. It is unclear how Izawa responded to this letter. At any rate, in 
Miki’s library at Hosei University, we =nd the second edition (1942) of this work.
Miki incorporated Takeuchi’s ideas into his own thought, speci=cally the major 
parts of “Shinran.” !erein, “Rekishi no jikaku” 歴史の自覚 (!e Awareness of His-
tory) and “Sangan tenny$” 三願転入 (Turning through the !ree Vows) were inspired 
by Takeuchi’s writing. !is does not mean that Miki adopted parts of Takeuchi’s 
Ky#gy#shinsh# interpretation in a piecemeal fashion. As I will make clear below, Miki’s 
understanding of the logical structure of the entire Ky#gy#shinsh# followed Takeuchi’s 
interpretation. !e fact that Miki does not cite Takeuchi’s work was not his fault, but 
due to the fact that “Shinran” is a posthumous manuscript.
Miki’s and Takeuchi’s understandings of Shinran share the same sources; not only 
were they familiar with Shin Buddhism from a very young age, but they also were 
exposed to the teachings of Chikazumi J#kan as young men. Furthermore, this was 
not temporary; both Miki and Takeuchi were cognizant throughout their lives of their 
indebtedness to Chikazumi and expressed this publicly. If this is the case, we could even 
say that it would actually be unnatural if there were no similarities between their under-
standings of Shinran.
I have already talked about the relationship between Miki and Chikazumi. Here 
I will write in some detail about the relationship between Takeuchi and Chika-
zumi. Takeuchi accompanied his friends to hear Chikazumi in Tokyo’s Hong#, 
and in 1950 he would write down his memory of that time in his “Shinsh$ ky#ke 
no mondai” 真宗教化の問題 (!e Issue of Shin Buddhist Teaching): “I was able 
to receive the teachings of Chikazumi J#kan-sensei due to the introduction of my 
65 MKZS 20: 291.
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friend ‘I’ at Ky$d# Gakusha. It was in his later years, and I will probably never for-
get until I die how moved I was at the time. His voice still echoes in my ears, and 
the depth of his teachings truly gush forth like a spring from my chest as a truth 
that cannot be exhausted.”66 Takeuchi’s sense of a<nity to Chikazumi was stron-
ger than that of Miki’s, and he continued to revere him throughout his life. It was 
in this context that he wrote Ky#gy#shinsh# no tetsugaku. At the beginning of this 
work, he states, “Fortunately, I have been able to encounter a teacher and a friend 
who both live in the religious belief of Shinran. !e radiance and character of this 
teacher and this friend taught me the immeasurable loftiness of this religious belief. 
!at Ky#gy#shinsh# serves as indispensable food for my mind and my soul owes 
much to the in>uence of this teacher and this friend.”67 !e teacher that Takeu-
chi is referring to is Chikazumi, and the friend was an old man named “Wasabur#” 
和三郎. Wasabur# was a living example of the Shin Buddhist conversion from self 
power belief to other power belief as understood by Takeuchi. Takeuchi heard from 
Wasabur# about the actual experience of “turning through the three vows,” a sub-
ject which he addressed head-on in Ky#gy#shinsh# no tetsugaku. Takeuchi recalled his 
encounter with Wasabur# as follows:
I came to know him when he was around seventy-=ve or [seventy-]six. At 
the time I was twenty-=ve, so we were over =fty years apart. As he said, 
I was “like a grandchild.” However, leaving school and returning to my 
hometown temple, he welcomed me with a respect that stemmed from his 
una;ected heart. I =rst came to know of the depth of his religious belief 
one day when he told me about “turning through the three vows,” which 
he had heard dozens of years ago in a sermon. Of course, he did not know 
about the Shin sectarian subject of “turning through the three vows.” How-
ever, he accurately grasped the core of the issue based on his own experi-
ence and his excellent understanding of the sermon’s content. Having just 
begun research on the Ky#gy#shinsh# that took this same issue as a starting 
point, this was very bene=cial guidance for me. We often would talk about 
the issue of religious belief.68
Sometime later Wasaburo would have a decisive conversion experience based on the 
words of Chikazumi that Takeuchi had shared with him.
!e hot red torch of [Chikazumi] Sensei’s joy from entrusting (shingy# 
信楽) [himself to Amida] appeared to =re up even my mind—a poor 
66 Takeuchi Yoshinori chosakush" (hereafter, TYCS) 1: 253.
67 TYCS 1: 4.
68 TYCS 1: 249–50.
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conductor—to the same high heat. It was amid this deep emotion that I 
discussed in detail with the old man Wasabur# what Chikazumi-sensei had 
taught me. When I told the old man that Chikazumi-sensei said, when 
parting ways with me for the last time, “Other power, you must not forget 
Other Power,” Wasabur# said, “Oh, is that so, he said ‘Other Power, you 
must not forget Other Power?’” !en, on a very rainy afternoon four or =ve 
days later, he came with his small granddaughter to my place. Upon taking 
his hand and showing him inside, [while kneeling] he all of a sudden [leaned 
forward and] placed his shaking hands on the ground, confessing, “While 
for a long time I was blessed with the opportunity to hear about it, I had 
forgotten about Other Power. It is such a waste. I am so sorry.” From his 
closed eyes tears shed onto the tatami. I knew what was happening before 
my own eyes. Feeling a mix of, on the one hand, the urgent tension present 
when hearing serious news about a historical event on the radio that will 
probably determine one’s fortune yet appears unrelated to oneself, and, on 
the other hand, blank vacancy, I listened to his confession. !is old man’s 
thirty years of e;ort had =nally stepped over its last peak. Even so, just how 
kind, yet precipitous, is the path of the easy practice of Shin Buddhism? I 
was unable to raise my shameful face, confronted with my deep emotion 
and a perception of myself that appeared super=cial upon re>ection. It was 
shortly thereafter that old man Wasabur# would have a great rebirth that 
brought joy to everyone.69
Takeuchi wrote Ky#gy#shinsh# no tetsugaku in the wake of these religious exchanges 
with Chikazumi and Wasabur#. Takeuchi’s thought cannot simply be reduced to 
Chikazumi’s sermons or Wasabur#’s experience because he clearly developed his own 
world of philosophical contemplation. With that said, his philosophical thought took 
living religious people as models, and so it was only natural that it would be in>uenced 
by them. In the next section I will look into this in>uence in more detail.
From Chikazumi to Miki Kiyoshi and Takeuchi Yoshinori
In order to identify the Shin Buddhist thought that Chikazumi passed on to Takeuchi 
and Miki, it will be useful to =rst compare him with his teacher Kiyozawa Manshi. 
Following Kiyozawa, Chikazumi engaged in research on the philosophy of religion 
when he was young. !e philosophical essays that Chikazumi wrote after graduating 
from Tokyo Imperial University aimed to lay a philosophical foundation for Buddhist, 
69 TYCS 1: 253–54.
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particularly Shin Buddhist, doctrine.70 When doing so, he primarily referred to 
Hegelian philosophy, which was precisely how Kiyozawa tried to ful=ll the same aim. 
However, while their orientation may have been the same, Kiyozawa and Chikazumi 
emphasized di;erent points in their writing on the subject. Kiyozawa was primarily 
interested in =elds like ontology, and he took in Hegelian logic and applied it to Bud-
dhism.71 In contrast, Chikazumi paid attention to how truth manifests in the historical 
world. A typical example of this is his focus on the relationship between the develop-
ment of the shinjin 信心 (the entrusting mind) of the individual and the historical 
world. When Chikazumi gave a presentation in Paris, he discussed how Buddhist truth 
had manifested itself in Japanese history. With regard to Shinran, he touches upon the 
“turning through the three vows” as found in the Ky#gy#shinsh# and discusses the order 
by which one “goes through the process of ‘turning through the three vows’ and arrives 
at belief in Shin Buddhist other power.”72 !is is not discussed by Kiyozawa. !eir dif-
ference in this respect is, to put it in terms of Hegelian philosophy, due to Kiyozawa 
taking logic as his model for philosophy, and Chikazumi focusing on the philosophy of 
history and the phenomenology of spirit. Chikazumi took as his main subjects aspects 
of Hegel’s thought that Kiyozawa had not developed but needed to be addressed.
Both Kiyozawa and Chikazumi began by referring to such Hegelian philosophy 
and attempting to make the world of absolute other power philosophically clear. !ey 
clari=ed the meaning of renouncing philosophical inquiry and entrusting oneself to 
the power of Amida Buddha’s vow amid the deepening of this religious belief. On 
this point they are the same. However, while Kiyozawa seeks the purity of a world of 
religious belief that is distinguished from the outside world, Chikazumi focuses on the 
concrete relationship between aAiction-=lled human beings and the absolute. He both 
emphasizes that foolish people (bonbu 凡夫) are drawn to the compassion of Amida 
Buddha and touches upon the ethical way of being in daily life after one has acquired 
other power belief. It is for this reason that he discusses homelife and life in society—
those things which make religious life possible—as well as sometimes even discussing 
the relationship between religion and the state.
Miki’s “Shinran” is di<cult to understand and has been often misread largely 
because it is an incomplete set of notes. However, I believe that there are also two other 
70 "mi Toshihiro has already discussed in some detail the relationship between Chikazumi’s own 
philosophy and religion. See "mi 2010, which is included in an expanded form in "mi 2014.
71 Regarding the relationship between Kiyozawa Manshi and Hegelian philosophy, see Fukasawa 
1991.
72 Chikazumi 1896, p. 801. In the =rst half of this article we =nd Hegel listed as the =rst philoso-
pher to advocate a “history of philosophy” that aimed to completely harmonize philosophical prin-
ciples and history. However, Chikazumi does not attempt, for example, to compare “turning through 
the three vows” with Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. Takeuchi was the =rst person to truly elucidate 
the Ky#gy#shinsh# from the perspective of Western philosophy.
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factors that have led to misunderstandings. First, Miki understands Shinran’s logic of 
“turning through the three vows” as something that runs throughout the Ky#gy#shinsh# 
as a whole. Second, Miki expands this logic and ultimately goes so far as to discuss a “life 
in society” that is based on shinjin. For the former, Miki has inherited Takeuchi’s frame-
work for understanding Shinran.73 However, Miki, without much explanation, uses 
that which has been carefully discussed by Takeuchi as if it is self-evident. Also, Miki 
greatly di;ers from Takeuchi with regard to the latter point. Takeuchi, rather faithfully 
to the structure of Shinran’s writing, understands and investigates the logic of “turning 
through the three vows” as a logic of conversion from self power belief to other power 
belief. However, Miki’s primary interest is life in society after this turn.
Both Takeuchi and Miki were close to Chikazumi, and his teachings greatly reso-
nated with them. While their interests were therefore similar, their philosophies were 
not the same. Takeuchi was sympathetic to the way of being of concrete, historical 
people found in Chikazumi’s sermons, yet was primarily interested in the logic of 
individual conversion. Miki, on the other hand, had a greater interest than Takeuchi 
in the construction of a life in society based on religion. To put it in rather rough 
terms, Chikazumi’s religious activities had the two facets of internal religious belief and 
societal connection, and Takeuchi primarily took in the former, while Miki the latter. 
However, they were similar in that they both tried to =nd two philosophical aspects 
of Hegel—his phenomenology of spirit and his logic—in the Ky#gy#shinsh#. !ey also 
both inherited Chikazumi’s interest in the historical nature of Shin Buddhist belief, 
albeit while emphasizing di;erent points. 
Takeuchi, comparing the structure of the Ky#gy#shinsh# to the relationship between 
Hegelian phenomenology of spirit and logic, o;ers the following explanation.74 
!e phenomenology of spirit is the stage that preceeds logic. It is preparatory study. 
However, phenomenology of spirit and logic are like two sides of one coin, and only 
acquire a concrete meaning when they complement each other. !e six chapters of the 
Ky#gy#shinsh# can be divided into the =rst =ve (“J#do shinjitsu” 浄土真実 [!e Pure 
Land Truth]) and the sixth (“H#ben keshindo” 方便化身土 [!e Expedient Land of the 
Transformation Body]). !e latter corresponds to the phenomenology of spirit, and the 
former to logic. In other words, the “H#ben keshindo” portion of the text, in which 
“turning through the three vows” is discussed, is an expedient means for reaching the 
truth of the Pure Land. It is a preparatory stage. !e majority of religious thinkers 
and doctrinal scholars have placed more of an emphasis on the “J#do shinjitsu” por-
tion in their understandings of the Ky#gy#shinsh#. !is was also the case for Kiyozawa 
73 Takeuchi’s Ky#gy#shinsh# no tetsugaku played a major role in the creation of Tanabe Hajime’s 
Zanged# toshite no tetsugaku 懺悔道としての哲学 (Philosophy as Metanoetics; 1948). !is means that 
the in>uence of Chikazumi’s thought extended to Tanabe through Takeuchi. See Tanabe 1963, p. 6.
74 TYCS 1: 9.
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Manshi and other Shin modernists. Insofar as I am aware, Kiyozawa does not even 
discuss the “H#ben keshindo” portion of the text. However, Takeuchi held that the 
Ky#gy#shinsh# is structured in such a way that its profound meaning only becomes 
apparent after these two sections come together and re>ect each other; he also saw 
the “turning through the three vows” of the “H#ben keshindo” as being the logic 
that runs throughout the entirety of the text. For this reason, he understands “turn-
ing through the three vows” as an idea that forms the foundation of Shinran’s ideas 
regarding rebirth in the Pure Land. Takeuchi, drawing from Hegel’s phenomenology 
of spirit, holds that “turning through the three vows” (Shinran’s logic of conversa-
tion) is closely connected to the historical world. Furthermore, he also states that the 
basis of Shinran’s logic of conversation lies in his Buddhist view of history: “!e true 
Dharma, semblance Dharma, and degenerate Dharma view of history is actually the 
transcendental basis of ‘turning through the three vows,’ and it is based on this tran-
scendentally existing view of history that the temporality of the self-edi=cation of this 
turn comes into existence.”75 
Shinran explains three of Amida Buddha’s forty-eight vows by linking them to the 
logic of religious conversion. While many Shin Buddhist scholars have discussed “turn-
ing through the three vows,” it was Takeuchi’s idea to connect this to Buddhism’s view 
of history and seek their basis therein. Of course, this Buddhist view of history refers 
to the three periods after ?@kyamuni’s death in which people receive his teachings in 
di;erent ways. !e period immediately after his death is referred to as that of the “true 
Dharma.” During this time period, the teachings (ky# 教), the practice of implement-
ing these teachings ( gy# 行), as well as the result of doing so, or enlightenment (sh# 
証), all exist. However, during the age of the “semblance Dharma,” while the =rst two 
exist, people cannot reach enlightenment. During the period of the “latter Dharma,” 
only the teachings remain, and people are unable to engage in religious training and 
become enlightened. By seeking the basis for “turning through the three vows” in this 
Buddhist view of history, Takeuchi interprets Shinran’s logic as one in which the logic 
of religious conversion is not reduced to the internal world of human beings but is 
understood in terms of its dynamic connection with the historical world. Miki’s under-
standing of Shinran incorporated this perspective as is.76 !e section “Rekishi no ji-
kaku” 歴史の自覚 in Miki’s posthumous work is a comparatively organized discussion, 
and therein, based on Takeuchi’s detailed logical development, Miki tries to under-
stand Shinran’s view of history that takes the subject as a starting point.
75 TYCS 1: 14–15.
76 “!e fact that the Buddhist view of history of the three time periods is discussed immediately fol-
lowing the self-admonition of ‘turning through the three vows’ in the Ky#gy#shinsh#’s ‘Keshindo’ chap-
ter must be understood to indicate that an awakening based on this view of history is the foundation 
of ‘turning through the three vows’” (MKZS 18: 456).
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Using Takeuchi’s logic, Miki tries to =nd the basis for Shinran’s teaching of akunin 
sh#ki 悪人正機 (the salvation of evil persons) in the notion of the latter Dharma age. 
Takeuchi explains Shinran’s ideas regarding the “non-observance of the precepts” in 
terms of the dynamic logic of conversion as follows. !e realization of “non-observance 
of the precepts” must be accompanied by the reappearance of the true Dharma. Unlike 
“violating the precepts” (hakai 破戒), “non-observance of the precepts” is not something 
that directly rejects the good. It does not approach “the good” in this way. However, in 
“non”-observance, the non-existence of the precepts is shown, and something like their 
traces are evoked. In order to understand evil as evil today during the latter Dharma 
age, something needs to serve as a standard, and Shinran developed a logic in which 
this standard is summoned via traces while being accompanied by historical conscious-
ness. It is here that Takeuchi found the profundity of Shinran’s insight as a religious 
thinker.77 Following Takeuchi’s understanding of Shinran, Miki expresses it as follows:
How does non-observance of the precepts become recognized? By aware-
ness of the basis of non-observance of the precepts. !is basis is nothing 
other than the true, semblance, and latter Dharma age view of history. !e 
era of the latter Dharma age is the basis from which the state of non-obser-
vance of the precepts comes into existence. Awareness of the latter Dharma 
inevitably brings about awareness of the true Dharma age. Based on this, 
the true, semblance, and latter Dharma age view of history comes into exis-
tence. Recalling the latter Dharma age makes one more and more deeply 
aware of the sadness of belonging to the latter Dharma age. One becomes 
aware that the non-observance of the precepts is in the context of the viola-
tion of the precepts, that it is the extreme limit of violating the precepts.78
In this way he states that the teaching of akunin sh#ki holds that the “evil person” 
who awakens to “themself as the lowest class of foolish person” is the object of Amida 
Buddha’s salvation.79 Here we must note that salvation does not happen when sentient 
beings deepen their awareness of their own transgressions. !e functioning of an abso-
lute being occupies a decisive position in salvation. !erein a view of the history of the 
77 “In order to awaken to the hindrances of transgressions, it is necessary in the present to again 
bring back the three historical ages of the true, semblance, and latter Dharma in some form within 
the awareness of Dasein ( gensonzai 現存在). If this history of the true, semblance, and latter Dharma 
ages can in this way be repeated within Dasein, and be remembered (erinnern) via this repeating, then 
the world itself that comes into existence by this history of the true, semblance, and latter Dharma age 
itself is internalized (er-innern) within Dasein via this repeating. However, how is it possible to repeat 
the three ages of the true, semblance, and latter Dharma in the present? In order to repeat [them] we 
must reproduce the true Dharma age in some form” (TYCS 1: 32).
78 MKZS 18: 454–55.
79 MKZS 18: 458.
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Pure Land teachings, which is the other side of the aforementioned Buddhist view of 
history, is necessary. !e idea that these two views are two sides of one coin is Take-
uchi’s own understanding of Shinran’s thought, and Miki adopts this as is.80 Let us 
turn to Miki’s explanation of the history of Pure Land teachings.81
According to Miki, in one way, the absolute nature of the teaching of Amida Bud-
dha’s original vow (hongan 本願) uniquely corresponds to the latter Dharma age. In 
another way, it has a true absoluteness in that it is universally applicable to all eras. !e 
absoluteness that, without departing from history, runs throughout and in history, is 
found in its tradition. Shinran understood this tradition in terms of seven eminent 
monks: India’s N@g@rjuna (Jp. Ry$ju 龍樹; ca. 150–ca. 250) and Vasubandhu (Jp. Ten-
jin 天親; >. ca. 4th or 5th c. CE), China’s Tanluan 曇鸞 (Jp. Donran; ca. 476–542), 
Daochuo 道綽 (Jp. D#shaku; 562–645), and Shandao 善導 (Jp. Zend#; 613–681), 
and Japan’s Genshin 源信 (942–1017) and H#nen 法然 (1133–1212). !e teaching of 
Amida Buddha’s original vow that was preached by ?@kyamuni has been revealed by 
the seven eminent monks who span across great distances in time and place. A view of 
history that in this way shows the absoluteness of the original vow of Amida Buddha is 
the view of history of the Pure Land teachings. !e historical nature of the teachings, 
while always connected to the absolute entity that is Amida Buddha’s original vow, is 
found not as a philosophical concept but in the seven eminent monks, actual human 
beings. Miki quotes as an example of this a famous passage from the second chapter 
of the Tannish#: “As for me [Shinran], I simply accept and entrust myself to what my 
revered teacher [H#nen] told me, ‘Just say the nenbutsu and be saved by Amida’; noth-
ing else is involved.”82 Here, says Miki, we do not simply =nd Shinran’s “inner reli-
gious belief,” but a view of the history of Pure Land teachings throughout which the 
“absolute,” mediated by actual human beings, runs.
!is assertion regarding the inseparable nature of these two views of history is not 
present in Chikazumi’s thought. However, we do =nd traces of Chikazumi’s in>uence 
on Miki’s view of how religious truth appears dynamically in history. Miki’s library 
includes Chikazumi’s Tannish# k#gi, and therein Miki has underlined the terms “legal-
ism” (ripp#shugi 律法主義) and “absolute salvation” (zettai ky"sai 絶対救済). In the 
introduction to this work, Chikazumi explains religion in terms of the dynamic tension 
between an emphasis on the observance of rules (or legalism), an emphasis on salvation 
80 !e correspondence between Takeuchi’s and Miki’s thought is clear from their two following 
statements: “We can =nd Shinran’s view of the history of Pure Land teachings, which is the other side 
of the true, semblance, and latter Dharma age view of history, in the ‘Sh#shinge’ 正信偈 in the ‘Gy#’ 
行 (Practice) chapter and in the K#s# wasan 高僧和讃” (TYCS 1: 127), and “In this way, we know that 
the true, latter, and semblance view of history, and the view of the history of Pure Land teachings, are 
two sides of the same coin” (MKZS 18: 467).
81 MKZS 18: 458–70.
82 MKZS 18: 465–66. Translation from Hirota et al. 1997, p. 662.
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(ky"saishugi 救済主義), and an emphasis on faith (shink#shugi 信仰主義). Noting that 
Christianity’s emphasis on salvation came into existence after destroying Jewish legalism, 
he says that ?@kyamuni’s Buddhism and the easy practice of the nenbutsu re>ect the abso-
lute emphasis on salvation through faith that came into existence after destroying legal-
ism. We should note that Chikazumi points out the danger of reverting to legalism even 
after it has been left behind and an emphasis on salvation through faith has appeared. He 
says that after Shinran’s death, his emphasis on salvation reverted to legalism among his 
followers, and then the Tannish# was written in response. Here we can see an orientation 
towards understanding religious conversion with historical reality, or the beginnings of an 
analysis in a philosophy of religion that attempts to understand religion within dynamic 
history. It is highly likely that Miki was in>uenced in some way by this passage. We could 
say that Miki philosophically re=ned Chikazumi’s passionate preaching that did not 
fully engage in philosophical scrutiny, as well as the content Chikazumi expressed by the 
practice-oriented concept of ky"d# 求道 (seeking the way).
Miki might not have known that Takeuchi had become a follower of Chikazumi 
after him. At any rate, though, he found elements in Takeuchi’s understanding of 
Shinran that he could use for his concerns. However, Miki did not passively accept 
Takeuchi’s arguments but rather developed his own philosophical questions while 
using them as a guide. Next I will show how Miki’s “Nietzschean task” and “societal 
reality” (both discussed above) are addressed in his posthumous manuscript “Shinran.” 
Miki highlights that Shinran does not discuss impermanence frequently.83 He states 
that while we could say that generally Buddhism tries to deepen the natural sense that 
all conditioned phenomena are impermanent so that it becomes an ingrained under-
standing, Shinran was unable to limit himself to the notion of impermanence. !is 
is because this notion, regardless of whether it is aesthetic or philosophical, leads to 
“contemplation” (kans# 観想) and is not practice-oriented. Since Shinran is practice-
oriented and ethical, he focused on awareness of one’s own transgressions: “In Shin-
ran the sense of impermanence has turned into a sense of one’s transgressions.”84 !e 
“Nietzschean task” spoken of by Miki is a confrontation with traditional naturalism, 
and this led him to position Shinran, who did not ground his thought in a naturalistic 
sensibility, as a pioneering religious =gure who was critical of it.85 Miki, having sought 
83 MKZS 18: 427–29.
84 MKZS 18: 429. Takeuchi describes the relationship between a sense of impermanence and a 
sense of one’s transgressions as follows: “!is awakening to the hindrances of transgressions is a state in 
which the unease over death has been further deepened ” (TYCS 1: 88). 
85 Sometimes there is the somewhat mistaken assertion that Shinran celebrated Japanese-style 
naturalism with the jinen h#ni 自然法爾 thought of his later years. Miki was preparing a response. In 
“Shinran,” Miki states that there are three kinds of jinen 自然 while quoting the Sutra of Immeasurable 
Life (Jp. Mury#ju ky# 無量寿経) and Shinran: g#d# jinen 業道自然, mui jinen 無為自然, and ganriki 
jinen 願力自然. He understood Shinran’s jinen h#ni as being that of ganriki jinen and was preparing 
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in Shinran a precedent for his critique of “nature,” saw in Shinran’s notion of “non-
observance of the precepts” the potential for the creation of new forms. “Non-observance 
of the precepts” refers to not having the precepts’ norms as an ethical foundation. To use 
Miki’s words, human beings are an “existence of nothingness” lacking an ethical founda-
tion; they are placed within a state of “nothingness.” Furthermore, salvation that takes 
the “precepts” as its direct basis is impossible. However, from Miki’s perspective, Shinran 
developed a new understanding of human existence as an “existence of nothingness” and 
proposed a new way of being for humans that involves a historical awakening. Miki prob-
lematized the absence of a “model” to regulate human life and explored how one could be 
produced. He also brought into relief the fact that nothingness is the basis for “indetermi-
nate things.” At that time in Japan it was di<cult to straightforwardly take refuge in the 
gods and buddhas. Furthermore, one could no longer simply just praise nature just as it 
was. In the same way that Nietzsche was the =rst one in the West to confront God, when 
trying to face o; with Japan’s traditions with this kind of focus, Miki encountered Take-
uchi’s writing on Shinran that positively interpreted “non-reliance on the precepts,” and 
incorporated it into his own thought. In “Shinran,” Miki then extended Takeuchi’s ideas 
to the “J#do shinjitsu” portion of the Ky#gy#shinsh#, which Takeuchi had not discussed 
head-on, and tried to examine, in terms of historical reality, how to live this life in society. 
Miki’s interest was directed towards how “the notion of non-observance of the 
precepts” was related to life in society, and in this way covered an aspect not found in 
Takeuchi’s work. !e =nal part of “Shinran” discusses “societal life.” Although “Shinran” 
was left incomplete, and its content not fully developed, the direction of Miki’s interest 
therein is clear. He is trying to discuss how to live in society during the latter Dharma 
age of the non-observance of the precepts.86 He states that the Buddhist teaching of 
the latter Dharma age is the nenbutsu and that it serves as the basis for a philosophy 
of fellowship on the Shin Buddhist path: “!e philosophy of ‘fellow companions and 
practitioners’ has a transcendental basis in that the nenbutsu is Amida Buddha’s trans-
ferring of merit.”87 Furthermore, he highlights that during an era of non-observance of 
the precepts, the laws of the world and society are important: “In the practicing of the 
Buddhist teaching without departing from life in the world lies the positive meaning 
to show the di;erence between the three (MKZS 18: 514–15). According to the jinen entry in the 
J#do shinsh" jiten 浄土真宗辞典, ganriki jinen refers to other power, namely, the practitioner believing 
in, and entrusting themself to, the power of Amida Buddha’s original vow, naturally being brought to 
rebirth in the Pure Land via the power of the vow without any calculation on their part. In contrast, 
g#d# jinen refers to results being produced based on good and evil acts in accordance with the law of 
cause and e;ect, and Shinran does not use jinen in this sense. Mui jinen refers to the world of enlight-
enment being an absolute state of in=nity that transcends the distinction of being and non-being. See 
J#do Shinsh$ Honganjiha S#g# Kenky$jo 2013, p. 289.
86 MKZS 18: 490–500.
87 MKZS 18: 492.
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of the non-observance of the precepts.”88 He also emphasizes doing away with super-
stition, attempting a kind of critique of religion. We must note that unlike Nietzsche, 
Miki does not focus on how the gods and buddhas came to “exist” in the =rst place. 
While he investigates the basis of value systems, focuses on the “non-observance of the 
precepts,” and engages in a critique of actual society and religion, he does not inquire 
into whether the transcendental basis of this—or, to use his expressions in “Shinran,” 
“Amida’s transfer of merit,” or, the “foundation of the doctrine”89—exists.
!e social ethics that Miki discusses in “Shinran” are not terribly special in terms of 
their content. However, there are some points we should highlight with regard to his 
method as a philosopher. Miki aimed to reconstruct societal ethics for the historical 
situation of the latter Dharma age, and also tried to discuss as a philosopher the form 
that one’s life assumes after acquiring shinjin. Discussing how a believing individual 
should live after covering the structure of the shinjin conversion experience is the 
same philosophical method as we found in his writing on Pascal. Miki’s philosophy of 
religion is not limited to simply postulating the existence of the gods or buddhas or 
wagering on their existence; rather, it also includes within its scope a religious life that 
is found after having postulated their existence. 
In the early period of his thought, Miki’s idea to construct a philosophy of religion 
=rst came to fruition in the form of his work on Pascal. Around 1930, he clearly began 
describing the relationship between his own thought and religion, and during the last 
years of his foreshortened life, he wrote “Shinran.” It is no exaggeration to state that his 
ideas therein comprise his life’s aim to complete a philosophy of religion. However, this 
philosophy of religion was not a philosophy that replaced religion. His philosophy was 
an essentially incomplete one in that it has a mediatory nature which in itself does not 
reach completion.
Miki’s life epitomizes that of intellectuals who lived through the era of ky#y#shugi. 
During his high school years, he met Chikazumi, and then later distinguished himself 
as a provider of ky#y#shugi thought. While Miki’s spiritual activities were diverse, they 
had religion as their basis, and the foundation of this religion was the Shin Buddhism 
reorganized by Chikazumi. Despite Chikazumi himself having renounced philosophi-
cal inquiry, Miki, hearing Chikazumi preach, spent his life pursuing the meaning of 
this religion. Miki was not the only person to have done so. While limited in number, 
other scholars like Takeuchi attempted to do so as well. While Chikazumi’s religious 
activities were complete in themselves, the generations that succeeded him would take 
on the task of inquiring into their philosophical signi=cance. 
(Translated by Dylan Luers Toda)
88 MKZS 18: 493.
89 MKZS 18: 452.
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